Governance, Regulation and Innovation: Introducing New Studies by Ugur, Mehmet
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Governance, Regulation and Innovation:
Introducing New Studies
Mehmet Ugur
University of Greenwich
December 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44151/
MPRA Paper No. 44151, posted 2. February 2013 20:44 UTC
  
Governance, Regulation and Innovation: Introducing New Studies 
Mehmet Ugur, University of Greenwich Business School 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We introduce new studies that argue in favour of: (i) according a central role to governance 
and regulation as potential determinants of innovation; and (ii) analysing the effects of 
governance and regulation on innovation in conjunction with the effects of the market 
structure. These studies were presented at an international conference at the University of 
Greenwich in September 2011 and will be published as an edited book titled Governance, 
Regulation and Innovation: Theory and Evidence on Firms and Countries (Edward-Elgar, 
2013). The studies explore the relationship between governance and regulation widely 
defined and innovation, taking into account the interactions between governance and market 
structure as well as between different dimensions of governance. They contribute to existing 
literature by providing new empirical evidence and by pointing out to complementary and 
offsetting innovation effects that may result from interactions between economic governance 
institutions, corporate governance rules, regulation on the one hand and the market structure 
on the other.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For a long time, determinants of innovation had been studied with an exclusive focus on 
market structure, industry characteristics, technology choice, and appropriability of the 
innovation profits. This institution-free approach can be traced back to Schumpeter’s (1934, 
1942) seminal work, which argued that large firms and concentrated market structures 
promote innovation. Arrow (1962) takes issue with the Schumpeterian hypothesis and 
demonstrates that a monopoly shielded against competition has less incentive to innovate 
compared to firms within a perfectly competitive market. According to Gilbert (2006), we are 
still far from a general theory of the relationship between innovation and market structure as 
industry characteristics, the nature of technological competition and the distinction between 
product and process innovation emerge as confounding factors. Yet, recent empirical work 
informed by Aghion et al (2002a, 2005) demonstrate that the relationship between market 
structure and innovation is likely to be non-linear, with competition fostering innovation at 
low levels of competition but reducing innovation when the initial level of competition is 
already high (Peneder, 2012).  
 
Although the quality of governance institutions does not feature in this debate, protection 
of intellectual property does. Indeed, together with product-market competition, protection of 
intellectual property determines the extent to which innovators can appropriate the returns on 
innovation. Hence, the relationship between institutional factors and innovation is implicit in 
the debate, but the latter has unfolded without due attention to the ways in which the wider 
institutional framework (including economic and corporate governance institutions) interact 
with market structure and other factors to affect innovation incentives and outcomes.  
 
Two strands in the literature represent a departure from this institution-free view of 
innovation: the national innovation systems (NIS) approach and the work on the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. In the pioneering work on NIS 
(Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988; Dosi, et. al., 1988; and Nelson, 1993), innovation is 
analyzed within a national environment that consists of government incentives for innovation, 
intellectual property protection, support for education, trade policies, competition and 
industrial policies, and economic culture. Although it lacks a fully-fledged institutional 
perspective, the NIS literature has been influential in shifting the attention towards the 
relationship between innovation and the national environment, which is an amalgam of policy 
and institutional factors that affect the costs and incentives faced by economic actors.  
 
However, the NIS literature has been criticized on two grounds. First, the work has 
remained mainly normative, indeed practical (see, Erickson’s contribution in chapter 10). 
Secondly, its normative quality has led to a strong policy uptake of its research outcomes, but 
its focus on the ‘right’ environmental factors that make countries or regions more innovative 
has created taxonomies rather than specific hypotheses that can be tested rigorously. This 
weakness is evident in the ways in which the ‘optimal’ NIS examples pointed out by this 
literature have changed over time, from the Japanese model in the 1990s to more varied 
models associated with emerging innovators such as China, India or Brazil. 
 
In contrast, the literature on the relationship between corporate governance draws on the 
agency theory or the theory of contracting to derive and test hypotheses about how corporate 
governance dimensions affect firm performance, including innovation. This literature tends to 
take the level of product-market competition as given and investigates the ways in which 
corporate governance rules may encourage or hinder innovation by resolving/minimizing the 
agency problem or facilitating contracting. Pioneering works include Hill and Snell (1988), 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Baysinger et al. (1991 on the relationship between 
board independence and innovation; Jensen (1988), Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Stein 
(1988) on the relationship between anti-takeover defences and innovation; and Graves (1988) 
and Hill et al. (1988) on institutional ownership and innovation. Extensive reviews of this 
literature are provided in Belloc (2012) and Sapra et al. (2009), with further reviews in 
chapters 3 and 4 of this volume by Engelen and van Essen and Hashem and Ugur, 
respectively.  
 
Most of the corporate governance literature tends to overlook the effects of market 
structure on innovation and how the latter may interact with governance with complementary 
or offsetting effects. Notable exceptions include Aghion et al. (1999, 2002b) who examine 
the interactions between CG dimensions and innovation, and some recent work by Sapra et al 
(2009) and Atanassov (2012) who include market structure as a control variable.  
 
The few studies on the relationship between macro-level governance institutions and 
innovation also tend to overlook the interaction between market structure and governance. 
For example, Keefer and Knack (1997: 591) reports that firms tend to invest less in new 
technologies if the rule of law is weak and the risk of ‘expropriation’ is high. This finding is 
supported by Clarke (2001), Lundvall et al.  (2002) , Dakhli and de Clercq (2004),  and 
Giménez and Sanaú (2007) who report that innovation performance tends to be lower in 
countries where the risk of expropriation is higher and the rule of law is weaker. More 
recently, Tebaldi and Elmslie (2013) demonstrate that institutional quality in general 
encourage innovation by facilitating patent registration, diffusion of ideas, enforcement of 
property rights and by reducing the uncertainty of new projects. Yet, none of these studies 
investigates the interactions between economic governance institutions and market structure. 
 
The key rationale for this book (and for the conference that preceded it in September 
2011 at the University of Greenwich) has been to develop the case for: (i) according a central 
role to governance as a potential determinant of innovation; and (ii) analysing the effects of 
governance dimensions on innovation in conjunction with the effects of the market structure. 
This rationale can be justified easily. Investment in innovation is costly and associated with 
uncertain returns. Furthermore, investment in innovation projects is characterized by 
indivisibilities and economies of scale. Third, it is difficult to ascertain the quality of the 
innovation projects due asymmetric information between innovators on the one hand and 
creditors or shareholders on the other. Finally, innovation projects may have spill-over effects 
and/or the results of innovation may be subject to partial non-excludability (Jones and 
Williams, 1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Mansfield, 1985; Jaffe, 1986; Acs et al., 1994). 
 
Hence, at a given level of product-market competition, innovation performance at the 
firm or national levels would depend on the extent to which governance institutions are 
effective in fostering innovation as a result of encouraging risk taking, resolving or 
minimizing collective action problems, mitigating market failures, and aligning the interests 
of different actors such as managers, shareholders, employees, and policy makers. Similarly, 
at a given level of governance quality, innovation performance also depends on the degree of 
competition, which determines the levels of pre- and post-innovations profits that can be 
appropriated by innovators. Given these dynamics, it is necessary to investigate not only the 
partial effects of governance and market structure on innovation but also the ways in which 
both dimensions interact and with what consequences for innovation. 
 ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION 
 
Our contribution in this book is empirical, but informed by seminal work on the economics of 
innovation and recent developments in the economics of governance institutions. According 
to North (1990, 1994), a country's institutional environment constrain actor’s choices and 
behaviour, and as such hinder or support economic performance in general and innovation in 
particular. Governance institutions can be considered as the ‘rules of the game’ and consist of 
both formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions include written rules, regulations, 
laws and contracts; whereas informal institutions consist of norms, values and trust that a 
society has developed and internalized over time.  
 
As Dixit (2009) has indicated, governance institutions affect economic outcomes in 
general because good governance is necessary for securing three essential prerequisites for 
market economies: (i) security of property rights; (ii) enforcement of contracts; and (iii) 
resolution of collective action problems. The relevance of these prerequisites for innovation 
is evident. Institutions that secure property rights foster innovation by enabling innovators to 
appropriate post-innovation profits (Acemoglu, 2006). In addition, governance institutions 
that secure contract enforceability reduces transaction costs and foster innovation by enabling 
firms to choose advanced technologies that tends to prevail in contract-intensive sectors 
(Acemoglu et al., 2007). Finally, institutions that minimize or resolve collective action 
problems also foster innovation because they facilitate internalization of the externalities 
associated with innovation, hence enabling countries or firms to avoid prisoners’ dilemmas in 
the management of common pool resources such as knowledge.  
 
Given these relationships between governance institutions and innovation, what remains 
to be explained is the combination of economic governance institutions, corporate 
governance rules and regulation within a single project. The normative explanation is the 
following: we aim to make a case for analysing innovation in the light formal and informal 
governance institutions that affect the costs and incentives faced economic actors. Therefore, 
we have cast the net wide and included both country-level economic governance and firm-
level corporate governance dimensions. The country-level governance dimension, in turn, is 
defined widely to include both general institutional indicators such as rule of law, 
accountability, control of corruption and bureaucratic efficiency; and more specific rules 
codified in product-market or industry regulations.   
 
Yet, we have not let our normative preferences dominate the choice of governance 
dimensions in our analyses. In his address to the one hundred and twenty-first meeting of the 
American Economic Association in San Francisco, Avinash Dixit (2009) has indicated that 
‘good economic governance underpins the whole Smithian process whereby individuals 
specialize in different tasks and then transact with one another to achieve the full economic 
potential of the society’. Furthermore, governance is not a disciplinary field per se, but ‘an 
organizing concept for many fields’ in social sciences and as such ‘offers a unique 
opportunity for the social sciences to have a meeting point … after their separation over a 
century ago.’ This perspective clearly indicates that regulation is a subset of economic 
governance as it also ‘underpins the Smithian process’ and affects the cost and incentive 
structures faced by economic agents.  
 
What about corporate governance? Is it justified to include the latter within a book that 
aims to make the case for more systematic analysis of the relationship between governance 
and innovation? Again, we draw on Dixit (2009), who considers corporate governance as the 
‘more popular cousin’ of economic governance and provides useful insights into the 
relationship between the two. Dixit (2009: 8, 11, 12) distinguishes between formal and 
informal governance institutions. Whereas the former include constitutions, the legislature, 
the judiciary and regulatory agencies; the latter include private ad social institutions that 
reduce transaction costs. Corporate governance rules adopted by firms (with or without a 
macro-level governance framework) can be considered as a subset of the informal 
governance institutions that internalize contracts and hence convert contract enforcement into 
an agency problem in corporate governance. Therefore, our inclusion of corporate 
governance as a subset of the governance framework is justified.  
 
GOVERNANCE, REGULATION AND INNOVATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
 
Given the rationale indicated above, contributors to this book endeavour to address the 
following questions: does governance affect innovation effort at country or firm levels? How 
does governance and market structure interact and affect innovation? Stated more 
specifically, do market structure and governance dimensions have complementary or 
offsetting effects on innovation? Do these interaction effects differ between 
economic/corporate governance and regulation? If good governance fosters innovation, how 
does the innovation effort affect policy reform aiming to enhance governance? Similarly, if 
regulation affects innovation, how does investment in innovation affect regulatory outcomes?  
 
Although the contributions in this book are embedded within relevant theoretical 
frameworks, their answers to these questions are essentially empirical. In other words, we let 
the data ‘speak’, making sure that our data analysis methods are appropriate and our models 
are informed by relevant theoretical perspectives on innovation, governance institutions, 
agency and contracting problems, regulation, competition, and policy reform. Seven of the 
eight main chapters are based on unique datasets that allow for investigating not only the 
relationship between governance widely defined and innovation, but also the interactions 
between the two. Two of the empirical chapters also examine the effects of investment in 
innovation on the probability of policy reform in 27 members of the European Union (EU) 
and on regulatory outcomes in public-private partnerships in the French water industry. 
Finally, one chapter takes a normative approach to develop the case for enhanced governance 
of intellectual capital – an emerging but less-easy-to-govern process of innovation compared 
to processes analysed in intellectual property or national innovation systems literature.  
 
The book is organized in three parts. In Part I, we present four chapters that investigate 
the relationship between innovation and governance, including country-level economic 
governance and firm-level corporate governance dimensions. Part II also includes four 
chapters, which focus on the relationship between regulation and innovation. Finally, we 
devote Part III to one chapter on governance of intellectual capital and a concluding chapter 
that summarizes the main findings and discusses their research and policy implications. 
 
In Chapter 2, Ugur begins with the observation that the existing literature tends to 
investigate two potential determinants of innovation (market structure and governance 
institutions) separately. In addition, the policy discourse tends to be based on the assumption 
that competition and innovation go hand in hand, with little or no attention to whether the 
competition-innovation relationship could be non-linear or how market structures and 
governance may interact and produce complementary or offsetting effects on innovation. 
Given this observation, Ugur argues that it is necessary to verify if product-market 
competition is conducive to innovation or whether innovation entails deadweight losses 
associated with market power as a driver of innovation. He also argues that it is necessary to 
pay attention not only to the partial effects of governance and market structure, but also to the 
interactions between the two to see if such interactions produce complementary or offsetting 
effects.  
 
The chapter by Ugur is based on a panel dataset on patenting activity in 24 OECD 
countries from 1988-2007. Following an extensive literature review, the chapter proposes a 
model in which the relationship between market power and innovation is non-linear and 
governance affects innovation both directly and indirectly through interactions with market 
power. The case for the model is based on theoretical and empirical insights from 
institutional economics (Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2007; Dixit, 2009) and economics 
of innovation (Aghion et al., 1999, 2002a, 2002b and 2005). Ugur utilizes a generalized least-
squares (GLS) estimator with panel-corrected standard errors (PCEs), which allows for error 
structures that are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels (Beck and 
Katz, 1995; Egger, 2002). This method is reported to be efficient when the number of time 
periods is close to the number of cases (countries) (Chen et al, 2009) – and this property 
matches the structure of the dataset used, which contains observations for 24 countries over 
20 years.  
 
One finding reported by Ugur is that the non-linear relationship between market power 
and innovation that is established at the firm level also holds at the national level. Another 
finding is that the non-linear relationship is U-shaped in the full sample, but it has an 
inverted-U shape in countries with higher-than-average levels of per-capita GDP, economic 
openness and governance quality scores. Ugur explains the difference by arguing that 
markets in the latter countries are contested more heavily (i.e., market power in these 
countries is usually lower than the sample average) and therefore the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis tends to holds – i.e., innovation is driven by increased market power when the 
initial level of the latter is relatively low.  
 
Ugur also provides novel evidence on the relationship between governance and 
innovation. He reports that the governance score (a composite index derived from 5 
governance indicators that include bureaucracy quality, control of corruption, investment 
profile, law and order, and government stability) is related positively to patenting activity in 
the full sample and in the split samples. Although similar findings are already reported in the 
literature, Ugur argues that the existing findings may suffer from model misspecification bias. 
He demonstrates market power interacts with governance and has an offsetting effect on the 
relationship between governance and innovation, leading to smaller marginal effects overall.  
In addition, the interaction between governance and market power also modifies the marginal 
effects of market power on innovation, having a complementary effect until the turning point 
of the U-shaped curve but an offsetting effect thereafter. Hence, Ugur establishes that both 
partial and the marginal effects (i.e., the sum of partial and interactive effects) of governance 
or market power on innovation may be biased if both variables and the interaction between 
them are not included in the model  
 
Ugur also reports a range of significant relationships between innovation and other 
country characteristics. For example, income inequality and economic openness are related 
negatively to patenting activity. On the other hand, per-capita GDP, depth of the stock market 
and military expenditures as percentage of GDP are related positively to patenting activity. 
The relationship between labour share in national income and patenting activity is also 
positive but it is significant only in some estimations. These findings are robust to sample 
selection and standardization of the standard errors.  
 
Chapter 3 by Peter-Jan Engelen and Marc van Essen focuses on the recent financial crisis 
and address a highly topical question: how do country-level economic governance institutions 
and corporate governance characteristics of the firms affect the rate of curtailment in research 
and development (R&D) expenditures by European firms during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009? To address this question, Engelen and van Essen assemble a dataset for 411 firms from 
16 European countries from 2006 to 2009. They estimate a model in which economic and 
corporate governance influences the management’s R&D investment decisions directly and 
indirectly as a result of interaction between the two dimensions of governance. The model is 
derived from a number of hypotheses that authors distil from existing theoretical and 
empirical work.  
 
Engelen and van Essen make three contributions to the evidence in this volume and the 
wider literature, two of which are novel. First, they provide evidence on the relationship 
between two governance dimensions and R&D effort during the crisis by taking into account 
both country- and firm-level data. Earlier studies have focused only on firm-level factors 
(Munari et al., 2010) or combined only industry-level data with country-level data (Barbosa 
& Faria, 2011). Secondly, they provide evidence on both partial and combined effects of 
different governance dimensions, taking into account the interactions between the two. 
Although the interaction between country-level economic governance and firm-level 
corporate governance has been investigated in other studies on firm performance, the study 
by Engelen and van Essen is the first that investigates the interaction in the context of 
innovation performance. Finally, the authors focus on the recent financial crisis and 
complement the literature that investigates the relationship between governance and 
innovation in European firms during normal times (Honoré et al., 2011; Munari et al., 2010).  
 
Engelen and van Essen report that firms with large institutional owners or under 
government ownership tend to curtail R&D investment more than other firms during the 
crisis. This finding is interpreted as evidence of institutional investors’ short time horizons, 
which induce preference for short-term gains as opposed to long-term commitment. This 
finding is in line with the wider corporate governance literature, which report that 
institutional investors they engage in high trading volumes around the announcements of 
quarterly earnings (Kim et al., 1997; Lang and McNichols, 1997; and Potter, 1992).  Firms 
under government ownership may be induced to curtail R&D investment as a result of fiscal 
deterioration. Neither board size nor CEO duality or board independence has a significant 
effect on R&D curtailment during crisis times.  
 
With respect to country-level governance institutions, Engelen and van Essen report that 
firms in countries that rely mainly on equity finance tend to curtail R&D spending more than 
others in countries that rely mainly on bank finance. The authors explain this finding by 
indicating that banks in Europe have opted for coordination with distressed firms rather than 
shutting down the credit lines. This finding is also supported by findings on the interaction 
effects, which indicate that market-based financial systems tends to augment the adverse 
effect of institutional ownership on R&D effort whereas the interaction between bank-based 
regimes and creditor rights is associated with higher R&D effort (i.e., less R&D curtailment).  
 
In chapter 4, Hashem and Ugur focus on the relationship between corporate governance 
and R&D expenditures by US-listed firms. Utilizing a panel dataset for more than 1,500 firms 
from 2004-2010, the authors investigate the partial and interactive effects of corporate 
governance on R&D intensity (R&D/sales ratio) by controlling for non-linear effects from 
market concentration. The joint analysis is justified on the grounds that both corporate 
governance and market structure affect R&D effort by influencing the incentives of the 
managers to invest in risky innovation projects. Corporate governance may enhance the R&D 
effort if it exerts discipline on managers and/or mitigates the agency problem by aligning 
managerial and shareholder interests. Similarly, market concentration also affects the R&D 
effort depending on the extent to which it causes managerial slack and/or affects the levels of 
pre- and post-innovation profits. Therefore, one needs to take account of interactions between 
the two. Paying attention to interactions between corporate governance and market structure 
is also necessary from an empirical perspective: partial effects from estimations that exclude 
the interaction term would be inaccurate due to model misspecification bias.  
 
The authors utilize a two-way cluster-robust estimation method that yields standard 
errors that are robust to cross-sectional and time-series dependence between the error terms 
and the independent variables. They control for non-linear relationship between market 
concentration and R&D intensity by utilizing an industry-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
and its square. Their corporate governance indicators capture four dimensions: board 
independence and board diversity; ownership structure (insider and institutional ownership); 
anti-merger defences; and shareholders’ rights.  
 
They report that board independence is related positively to R&D intensity and that 
market concentration acts as a complement that strengthens the positive relationship.  All 
other CG indicators (number of women directors on the board, percentage of shares owned 
by insiders and institutional investors, and percentage of vote required to approve mergers or 
amend company charters) are related negatively to R&D intensity. In addition, market 
concentration tends to have a substitution effect when it is interacted with these CG 
indicators. They also report that the relationship between market concentration and 
innovation has a U-shape, implying that an increase in market concentration is associated 
with lower R&D intensity when the initial level of concentration is low; but the change is 
positive when the initial level of concentration is high. These results are robust to other 
measures of R&D effort (R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures per employee) and to 
inclusion of firm-characteristics such as firm size, age, returns on assets, Tobin’s Q, and the 
ratio of long-term debt to capital as control variables.   
 
Hashem and Ugur’s findings confirm the non-linear relationship between competition 
and innovation analysed by Aghion et al (1999, 2002a, 2002b and 2005). They also provide 
novel evidence on the significance of interactions between market concentration and 
corporate governance indicators, after controlling for a wide range of firm characteristics. 
Their findings indicate that the effect of corporate governance rules is mediate through 
market concentration and the effect of market concentration is mediated through corporate 
governance rules.  
 
The last chapter in Part I is by Andrea Conte, who addresses the relationship between 
governance and innovation from a different angle. Conte is interested in the determinants of 
policy reforms that are likely to enhance a country’s innovation performance. In other words, 
his dependent variable is not innovation effort per se, but the extent of policy reforms that the 
European Union (EU) and its member states consider as necessary for better governance of 
the knowledge economy and better performance in terms of innovation.  The policy reforms 
are placed within five policy areas related to innovation: allocation of public resources for 
innovation, support for private-sector R&D, supply of researchers, projection of intellectual 
property rights and technology transfer 
 
Conte’s research is highly topical and policy-relevant as it provides new evidence on 
what factors tend to increase the probability of policy reforms by EU member states in the 
context of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 strategy.  The analysis is based on a rich 
panel dataset from the European Commission’s Database on Microeconomic Reforms 
(MICREF) and estimates a Probit model, in which the dependant variable is the reform 
performance of 27 EU members states in the five policy areas from 2004-2008. The time 
frame is determined by data availability for 27 member states. In the model, the probability of 
reform depends on two clusters of variables: (i) Innovation and education-related 
performance indicators (which include business and government R&D expenditures as 
percentage of GDP, patenting activity, human resources in science and technology sectors, 
and public expenditure on education); and (ii) a set of macroeconomic variables that include 
per-capita GDP, government debt, tax burden and a measure of the business cycle.  
 
The findings by Conte indicate that there are both convergence and divergence between 
EU member states with respect to the relationship between past innovation performance and 
undertaking of policy reforms that would encourage innovation in the future. Convergence is 
evident in policy areas related to governance of innovation inputs such as government and 
business R&D expenditures and expenditures on education. In these policy areas, countries 
with lower performance in the preceding year tends to have a higher probability of 
introducing reforms in the current year in order to enhance future performance. These 
findings indicate that the Lisbon Strategy, thorough its targets and monitoring mechanisms, 
have been effective in closing the gap between low- and high-performing member states in 
terms of building the governance structures necessary to support innovation.  
 
However, the evidence also indicates that the Lisbon Strategy is also associated with 
divergence between EU Member States in policy areas related to governance of the 
‘inventive stock’ reflected in the number of patents per-capita, technology trade and 
protection of intellectual property rights. In these areas, the current reform effort is positively 
related to past performance, indicating that the governance gap between high- and low-
performing Member States is widening. Hence, the findings by Conte indicate that the type of 
past innovation performance is an important predictor of policy reforms that would 
eventually affect the quality of the governance structures closely related to both innovation 
inputs such as R&D and education expenditures and innovation outcomes such as technology 
transfer and intellectual property. 
 
In Part II, we have four chapters on the relationship between regulation and innovation. 
In chapter 6, Demirel and Kesidou utilize a dataset of 289 UK firms that responded to a 
survey conducted by the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) in 2005 and 2006. The survey provides a valuable source of information on econ-
innovation expenditures by UK firms, with good coverage across manufacturing industries. It 
also allows for exploring the determinants of different types of eco-innovation investments 
in: (i) end-of-pipeline pollution control technologies (EOP); (ii) integrated cleaner production 
technologies (INT); and (iii) eco-innovation research and development activities (ECORD). 
The authors provide a review of the related literature and articulate a conceptual framework 
that relates eco-innovation investments to two sets of factors: the environmental regulation 
framework and the internal firm-specific motivations. The environmental regulation 
framework is depicted along two regulatory instruments: prescriptive regulations that require 
compliance with environmental protection standards and incentive-based regulations that 
entail environmental taxes and subsidies. So far as the internal firm-specific motivations are 
concerned, Demirel and Kesidou investigate the effects of organisational capabilities, 
efficiency considerations and corporate social responsibility (CSR) considerations. 
 
One novelty in this chapter is that the authors also distinguish between three types of 
environmental innovation expenditures. The distinction is based on the extent to which the 
innovation type affects the range of products produced and processes used by innovating 
firms. Expenditures on end-of-pipeline pollution control technologies (EOP) are considered 
at the lower end of the impact spectrum as manufacturing firms apply EOP solutions mainly 
to treat, handle, measure or dispose emissions and wastes from production. On the high end 
of the impact spectrum, we have eco-innovation R&D expenditures (ECORD) that enable 
firms to improve products and processes by devising solutions for cleaner production and 
consumption.  Environmental R&D has a higher technological impact because (a) it enhances 
absorptive capacity and (b) the scope of environmental R&D is not limited only to process 
innovations but also covers product innovations. Finally, integrated cleaner production 
technologies (INT) are considered to have a medium innovation impact as they help 
modifying production processes but fall short of inducing significant product innovation.  
 
Demirel and Kesidou utilize a Tobit regression methodology and report a rich set of 
findings. Their estimation results enable the reader to find out not only about the marginal 
effect of environmental regulation on the probability of a firm being an innovator, but also 
about decomposed effects on: (i) the probability that regulation induces the firm to undertake 
investments in eco-innovations; and (ii) the conditional mean level of eco-innovation 
expenditures that the firm undertakes.  
 
With regards to environmental regulation frameworks, their results indicate that 
prescriptive regulatory instruments are effective in driving two types of eco-innovation: EOP 
innovation at the lower end of the impact spectrum and ECORD innovation at the higher end 
of the impact spectrum. In contrast, incentive-based regulatory instruments such as 
environmental taxes fail to motivate any of the three eco-innovations considered, with the 
exception of marginal effect on the probability of innovation by existing innovators in the 
middle of the impact spectrum. In addition, Demirel and Kesidou report that prescriptive 
regulations increases the probability of eco-innovation not only by existing innovators but 
also by firms that are new to eco-innovation. This is in contrast to incentive-based regulation 
that only induces existing innovators to innovate (i.e., picks up winners) – and only in the 
case of medium-impact innovation investments in integrated technologies.   
 
These findings expand the existing evidence base not only by providing evidence on the 
relationship between regulation and different types of eco-innovation, but also by 
distinguishing the marginal effects on non-innovators as well as existing innovators.  Hence, 
the authors report not only a U-type relationship between prescriptive regulations and eco-
innovations, whereby prescriptive regulatory rules tend to have significant effects on the low 
and high ends the eco-innovation spectrum. They also report that prescriptive regulation 
tends to have stronger effects on the probability of non-innovators taking a decision to 
innovate compared to their effects on the innovation efforts of firms that are already 
innovators.   
 
Demirel and Kesidou also report interesting findings on other determinants of eco-
innovation. For example, efficiency considerations tend to be significant in driving eco-
innovation expenditures whereas CSR considerations are insignificant. The impact of 
environmental management systems (for example the effect of subscribing to ISO 14001) is 
reported to be positive and significant with respect to EOP and ECORD innovations. The 
decomposed marginal effects suggest that subscription to ISO 14001 standards is effective in 
motivating firms to start investing in EOP and has a significant but smaller effect on 
increasing the EOP investments of those firms that already invest in EOP. In the case of 
ECORD, ISO 14001 is only effective for persuading firms to invest in ECORD but does not 
motivate increased ECORD investments by firms with existing ECORD activities.  
 
Chapter 7 by Simon Porcher addresses the relationship between regulation and 
investment in information and communications technology (ICT) in a sample of 11 
manufacturing industries in 10 OECD countries over 26 years from 1980-2005. Porcher tries 
to establish whether different measures of regulatory stringency on its own or in interaction 
with closeness to the technology frontier can explain ICT intensity (i.e., the ratio of ICT 
investments to value added) at the industry-country level. To do this, he assembles data for a 
range of regulatory measures and other control variables that are used in the literature.  
 
Porcher utilizes four proxies for regulation, all of which are taken from OECD data. 
These include: (i) a regulatory environment indicator (REGREF) for network industries 
(telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, road freight), the output of which 
is heavily used by manufacturing firms in the sample; (ii) an indicator that measures the 
extent to which industries are constrained by administrative burdens, entry regulation and 
other market barriers in key non-manufacturing sectors such as network services, retail 
distribution, financial services and professional business services (REGIMP); (iii) an 
indicator of product-market regulation (PMR) that provides information about barriers to 
entry in each country; and (iv) an indicator public sector presence in product markets 
(PMRP).  
 
Closeness to the frontier (FRONT) is calculated using productivity levels for each 
industry in each country from 1980 until 2005. Closeness to the productivity frontier is 
measured as the ratio between the productivity in industry i in country j at time t and the 
highest productivity level in the same industry i at the same time t. The range of control 
variables captures different factors that influence ICT intensity and includes: the capital/labor 
ratio (KL), externalities (EXT) that captures the international intensity of the ICT capital 
input; and import penetration (MPEN) as a measure of the extent to which the market is open 
to external competition.  
 
Estimation results indicate that closeness to the frontier has a negative effect on ICT 
investment intensity across all estimations. This is to be expected because industries closer to 
the frontier needs to invest less in ICT to remain competitive. Secondly, regulation also tends 
to have a negative partial effect on ICT intensity. This is in line with the received wisdom, 
which expects a negative relationship between regulation and innovation. However, this 
partial effect does not tell the whole story as regulation interacts with closeness to the frontier 
and the interaction term (REG*FRONT) has a positive and significant effect in three out of 
four estimations. This means that an increase in regulation mitigates the negative effect of the 
closeness to the frontier and drives industries close to the frontier to increase their investment 
in ICT technology. It also indicates that regulation reduces the innovation effort in laggard 
industries that are distant from the frontier.  
 
Porcher tests if the marginal effect of regulation (i.e., the combined effects of regulation 
and the interaction term) is significant at different levels of closeness to the frontier. The test 
results indicate that the marginal effect is positive and significant when industries are at the 
technology frontier and negative and significant when closeness to the frontier is minimum. 
In between, the marginal effect is insignificant. Hence, regulation is more likely to slow 
down innovation when industries are far from the technology frontier, but it is not likely to 
slow down the innovation effort of the industries that are close to the frontier. Porcher 
proposes two explanations for these results. First, regulation may induce firms to remain 
competitive by investing in ICT as a means of improving quality standards and product 
variety rather than cutting costs. Secondly, regulation may encourage firms to undertake 
drastic rather than piecemeal innovation. Hence, the product market deregulation prescription 
of the Lisbon Agenda may be counterproductive. The Lisbon Agenda may be effective in 
securing innovation convergence between European industries by encouraging the laggards to 
invest in cost-cutting innovation; but it may remain ineffective in securing its declared aim of 
achieving convergence between EU and USA levels of innovation. 
 
The relationship between regulation and innovation is also an issue that Eshref Trushin 
investigates in chapter 8. Trushin utilizes a panel dataset for more than 1,000 pharmaceutical 
firms in 11 countries for the period 1997-2007.  The data is compiled from financial 
statements of the sample firms in the Orbis database. The analysis in this chapter is 
conducted in three steps. In step 1, Trushin conducts Pearson Chi-square and likelihood ratio 
independence tests to establish if R&D intensity (R&D/sale and R&D/assets ratios) is related 
to the stringency of price regulation and market concentration in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Then, he estimates average technical efficiency levels for firms within each country, using 
stochastic frontier modelling and a production function with three inputs: intangible assets, 
tangible assets, and labour. In the third step, he conducts independence tests to verify if the 
average technical inefficiency at the country level is related to the stringency of price 
regulation and market concentration.   
 
Trushin reports that there is no evidence indicating that the stringency of drug price 
regulations is systematically associated with R&D intensities or technical production 
inefficiency. The same result is obtained with respect to the relationship between market 
concentration and R&D intensities or technical production inefficiency. There is partial 
evidence indicating that the most liberal pharmaceutical price regimes in the UK and the US 
have the lowest inefficiency in the truncated normal time invariant random effect panel 
specification, but this result is not robust across other specifications for the inefficiency term. 
The policy implication of this result is that price regulations do not seem to prevent firms 
from achieving the highest level of output given factor inputs.  
 
A major limitation of the findings is that the small sample of only eleven countries 
reduces the power of the tests. Another major problem is the difficulty involved in accounting 
for the quality of intangible assets. Time discounting of patents and quality of patent 
portfolios can be major confounding factors, which must be taken into account in further 
research. 
 
The last chapter in Part II is Freddy Huet and Simon Porcher, who investigate how 
investment in innovation affects the balance between reputational and opportunistic behavior 
of private water companies in the French public-private partnership contracts (PPPs). 
Drawing on the relevant literature, Huet and Porcher demonstrate that water supply firms 
engaged in PPPs can be expected to increase their chances of winning the contract at the 
renewal stage by following two strategies: opportunistic behaviour aimed at reducing the 
probability of rivals’ market entry or by building a good reputation that would increase their 
probability of winning the contract. Although a rich literature exists on the determinants of 
opportunistic behaviour or reputational concerns in a principal-agent setting, the effects of 
investment in innovation on corporate behaviour in regulated industries are not investigated. 
Huet and Porcher set to address this issue.  
 
The authors utilize a dataset on the French water industry, compiled by the French 
Environment Institute (IFEN), the French Health Ministry (DGS) and the National Statistics 
Institute (INSEE). The dataset contains information on more than 4,000 French 
municipalities with water services under private management in 2004 and 2008. They argue 
that network update information transmitted by private suppliers to municipalities can be 
considered as a measure of reputational behaviour because such information reduces 
information asymmetries. Then, they set to investigate whether investment in geo-referring 
information systems (GIS) for leak detection is related to the probability of providing 
network information updates in 2008, taking into the account the effects of competition and a 
range of control variables.  
 
Investment in innovative leak detection systems is expected to have two effects on the 
probability of disclosing information to the municipality. On the one hand, GIS investment 
may induce incumbents to withhold network update information in order to strengthen the 
“lock-in” situation that makes the incumbent more likely to win the contract at the renewal 
stage. In this case, the incumbent is acting opportunistically. On the other hand, large 
investments made by an operator can be a signal of reputational concerns. In this case, 
investments in GIS leak detection systems will be associated with higher probability of 
transmitting information. 
 
The authors test these hypotheses by estimating a Probit model, in which they control for 
a range of variables that relate to the competition environment, the contractual characteristics 
and some control variables. Their findings indicate that investment in specific innovation 
capital input (GIS) has a positive and significant effect on the probability of reputational 
behaviour, which is measured as the probability of disclosing network information to the 
municipality. They explain this result by the fact that innovative investment in itself is a 
signal for reputational concerns and that information disclosure follows in tandem to 
reinforce the reputational signals. Furthermore, operators with GIS leak detection systems are 
able provide more timely and detailed information at lower variable cost compared to rivals 
with older systems.  
 
Huet and Porcher also report that competition from public-sector suppliers of water 
services and closeness to the end of the contract tends to increase the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, when interacted with innovation, competition from 
public-sector providers has a substitution effect on reputational behaviour. In other words, as 
the number of public-sector providers increase the probability of reputational behaviour 
decreases among incumbents that invest in GIS. Hence, they conclude that incumbents that 
invest in GIS tends to disclose less information when faced with competition from public-
sector providers compared to other incumbents with the same level of investment in GIS but 
lower level of competition from public providers.  
 
Huet and Porcher argue that their findings showed that firms involved in PPP contracts in 
the water sector may strategically react to the competitive environment by concealing 
network information in order to raise rivals’ entry costs. Therefore, some policies that aim to 
foster competition in this industry may fail if they don’t take into account the strategic 
behaviours that firms could adopt to protect their rents. Hence, they suggest that regulatory 
policies that reinforce the obligation for incumbents to invest in innovative capital may 
reduce the probability of opportunistic behaviour by incumbents. 
 
In the last chapter, Erickson revisits the theme of corporate governance and innovation, 
but asks a different question: does the emergence of intellectual capital as a wider concept of 
innovation require a re-think on corporate governance? His answer is positive and depends on 
growing evidence that softer knowledge assets, i.e., the class of assets that are less amenable 
to be defined by structured innovation mechanisms, are additional sources of competitive 
advantage for the firm. Hence, Erickson makes the case for: (i) adding knowledge asset 
development and use to the remits of national innovation systems; and (ii) devising new 
corporate governance mechanisms that would induce managers to manage, report and protect 
these assets more effectively.  
 
According to Erickson, the national innovation system (NIS) approach has proved 
valuable during the past decades. It has provided a guide to the right national governance 
approach that would support innovation. However, the concept has remained practical and 
taxonomic; and does not lend itself to addressing the new type of knowledge assets that he 
describes as intellectual capital. Although intellectual capital is considered critical to firm 
performance, it is not protected by traditional intellectual property legislation. Hence, it is 
necessary to devise national innovation system approaches that would encourage the 
development and application of softer forms of knowledge by creating government programs 
to grow knowledge (education, infrastructure, etc.), by encouraging the establishment of 
common metrics and reporting standards, by creating protection mechanisms, and by forming 
procedures that would make government use of such assets predictable.  
 
However, effective governance in this realm may not be easy to develop and implement, 
as returns on intellectual capital are often not accruing until some years in the future.  
Therefore, corporate governance rules should be developed to facilitate the management, 
reporting and protection of intellectual capital. Corporate managers should be able to show 
that they have procedures and rules to protect such valuable proprietary assets, both from 
prying competitors and from sloppy collaborators, including government.  In short, effective 
corporate governance faces a number of new concerns that were not even on the radar two 
decades ago.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As indicated above, this volume is based on papers presented to an international conference 
on governance and innovation held at the University of Greenwich in June 2011. At the time, 
the call for papers indicated that the relationship between innovation and governance is a 
relatively under-studied area of research. This has been the case despite extensive work on 
the relationship between governance quality and other performance indicators such as 
growth, firm value, investment, and income distribution. In addition, potential synergies that 
may result from combining economic governance, market structure, corporate governance 
and regulation remain to be explored. The conference aimed to bring together innovative 
research papers that explore the relationship between governance widely defined and 
innovation, taking into account the interactions between governance and market structure as 
well as between different dimensions of governance. 
 
The contributors to the conference and to this edited volume have risen to this challenge 
very well by undertaking innovative and empirically-rich studies. The summary above does 
reflect these qualities to some extent, but it is far from doing justice either to the effort of the 
contributors or to the richness of their analysis. Hence, I would like to conclude this 
introductory chapter by tanking the contributors again and inviting the reader to explore the 
perspectives and evidence they provide on governance and innovation outcomes at firms, 
industry and country levels.  
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